

JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MICHIGAN-OHIO-KENTUCKY-TENNESSEE

In re:
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct

*
*
*No. 06-13-90020
*
*
*
*

M E M O R A N D U M

This complaint was filed with the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit pursuant to the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, P.L. 96-458, as amended by the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-203, the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, and the Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct adopted by the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit.

After conducting an initial review, the chief judge may dismiss a complaint as to which he concludes:

- (1) that the claimed conduct, even if the claim is true, is not "conduct prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts" and does not indicate a mental or physical disability resulting in inability to discharge the duties of office;
- (2) that the complaint is directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling;
- (3) that the complaint is frivolous, a term that includes making charges that are wholly unsupported.

Rule 4(c), Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct or Disability.

This complaint was filed by a federal prisoner against the district judge who sentenced him to the term of imprisonment he is serving. Following a jury trial in 1995, complainant was convicted of serious federal crimes, and the named district judge sentenced him to life imprisonment, plus a lengthy consecutive term. The Sixth Circuit affirmed complainant's convictions in 1996, and complainant unsuccessfully pursued various avenues of post-conviction relief. In his complaint of judicial misconduct, complainant contends that the named judge treated him unfairly at trial because complainant was a member of a racist group.

Review of the pertinent court records reflects that, contemporaneously with filing this complaint of judicial misconduct, complainant filed a motion to dismiss his criminal case

and averred that the named judge's recusal was required. Complainant supplemented his complaint with the motion, and with the named judge's subsequent ruling denying the motion to dismiss and another ruling denying a motion to reopen the case.

Even read indulgently, the gravamen of this complaint of judicial misconduct is that the named district judge made erroneous rulings in complainants' underlying proceedings. Under these circumstances, this complaint is subject to dismissal in part as directly related to the merits of the named judge's decisions in complainant's criminal case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) and Rule 11(c)(1)(B) of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings. Such decisions, including any allegedly improper failure to recuse, are not the proper subject of a complaint of judicial misconduct. See Rule 3(h)(3)(A), Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings. The Judicial Council is not a court and has no jurisdiction to review any rulings by a judge, or to grant relief requested in the underlying case. See *In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct*, 858 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1988). Complainant's allegations, at least in part, directly challenge the merits of the named judge's rulings in his case and are therefore not a proper subject of a complaint of judicial misconduct.

Otherwise, complainant's contentions that the named judge was biased are insufficiently supported by credible facts to warrant an investigation by a special committee appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 353. "An allegation may be dismissed as 'inherently incredible' even if it is not literally impossible for the allegation to be true. An allegation is inherently incredible if no reasonable person would believe that the allegation, either on its face or in light of other available evidence, could be true." Implementation of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee, Sept. 2006, p. 148. Complainant's contentions, asserted many years after his trial, are devoid of factual support in the court record and are inherently incredible. The complaint therefore will be dismissed in remaining part pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(iii) and Rule 11(c)(1)(D) of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings.

Accordingly, this complaint will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A)(ii) & (iii) and Rules 3(h)(3)(A) and 11(c)(1)(B) & (D) of the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings.



Alice M. Batchelder
Chief Judge

Date: 03-25-14